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ABSTRACT  
   
Mexican drug cartels have been a difficult group to get official data on because of 
the clandestine nature of their operations and the inherent dangers associated with any 
type of research on these groups. Due to the close relationship that the United States and 
Mexico share, the United States being a heavy demander of illicit drugs and Mexico 
being the supplier or the transshipment point, research that sheds light on cartels and their 
effects is necessary in order to solve this problem. A growing concern is that cartels have 
been seeking to improve their international infrastructure. This could potentially be done 
by partnering with gangs located in the United States to help with the distribution of 
drugs. The author uses data from the 2009 and 2010 Arizona Gang Threat Assessment 
and three sets of analyses (dummy variable regression, change score, multinomial 
logistic) to shed light on the possible partnership between cartels and U.S. based gangs. 
Primarily using the varying level of intervention strategies practiced by police 
departments throughout the state of Arizona, this study is exploratory in nature, but 
attempts to find the effectiveness of intervention strategies on "cartel affiliated" gangs, as 
identified by federal authorities, and how police departments respond towards these same 
groups. With the current data, there was no significant evidence that suggests that 
intervention strategies were less effective on "cartel affiliated" gangs or that police 
departments were responsive towards these “affiliated” gangs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The drug cartels in Mexico operated in their country relatively undisturbed for 
decades until Mexico’s president from 2006-2012, Felipe Calderón, decided to launch an 
initiative to eradicate the cartels from his country (Rawlins, 2011). This, of course, was 
not well received by the cartels. Violence broke and roughly 50,000 people have been 
killed or gone missing from 2006 to 2011 (Molzahn, Rios, & Shirk, 2012). This period, 
known as the “Mexican Drug War”, started in 2006 and is still happening in the streets of 
Mexico. This period has also been a large transitory stage for the cartels. There was a 
“civil” war amongst these groups to fight for drug trafficking routes to the United States 
(Beittel, 2013). These recent years have seen a massive upswing in visible cartel activity 
and their public desire to trade in the United States (Hanson, 2008). 
 Little research has been done on cartels because of the clandestine nature of their 
organizations. Through the use of secondary data, this study hopes to shed more light on 
these criminal organizations. According to the 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, 
Mexican drug cartels often use U.S. based gangs to help with distribution (National Drug 
Intelligence Center, 2010). Since it is difficult and dangerous to directly observe cartels, 
this study uses secondary data to see the effects law enforcement intervention strategies 
have on “cartel affiliated” gangs and the responsiveness police departments have towards 
these groups. The guiding questions for this study are: Have gang intervention strategies 
differently affected the activity of U.S. gangs that have possible associations with 
Mexican drug cartels as opposed to those gangs which are not affiliated? Are law 
enforcement agencies more responsive with their intervention strategies towards these 
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groups? While this study is exploratory in nature, it hopes to be used as a stepping-stone 
to facilitate future scholastic cartel research. This study is important because of the 
prominence of the cartel problem in both the U.S. and Mexico. In 2009, over 1,665 tons 
of illegal drugs were seized along the southwest border of the United States (Longmire, 
2011). Not only limited to drug trafficking, cartels practice human smuggling from 
Mexico into the United States as a revenue raising strategy. Arizona is chosen as the 
central state of analysis of this study because it shares a border with Mexico and is used 
as a corridor for smugglers (Quinones, 2009).   
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Mexican drug cartel activity has been steadily on the rise for decades, but has 
been exponentially growing since 2006 (Molzahn, Rios, & Shirk, 2012). There are 
estimates that suggest that there were 50,000 murders perpetrated by cartel groups in 
Mexico from 2006 to 2011 (Molzahn et al., 2012). Political heads in Mexico have waged 
a war against the cartels in Mexico. Felipe Calderon, Mexico’s president from 2006-
2012, planned to eradicate the drug cartels, but only succeeded in increasing the violence 
in his country (Rawlins, 2011). During this time, cartels amped up their activity and 
fought amongst each other for crucial trading routes to the biggest demander of drugs, the 
United States. Historically, drugs have moved from the south to the north while guns 
moved south (Decker & Townsend, 2008). This partnership has worked for four main 
reasons. First, guns are widely available in the U.S. (firearms are illegal in Mexico). 
Second, the U.S. has a high demand for illicit drugs. Third, several Mexican institutions, 
such as government and law enforcement, have suffered allegations of corruption, thus 
making the government lose legitimacy and law enforcement ineffective. Fourth, legal 
and illicit trade has been occurring between the U.S. and Mexico through Mexico’s 
northern border for years (Decker & Townsend, 2008). Drug cartels have typically been 
known for smuggling marijuana, but have expanded their menu of illicit drugs smuggled 
into the United States to include cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine (National Drug 
Intelligence Center, 2010).  
 These cartels, looking for the most profit, often seek out the help of local U.S. 
gangs for distribution in the United States (Smith & Selee, 2013). Previous studies have 
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looked at the organizational structure of gangs and their ability to peddle drugs (Decker 
& Pyrooz, 2013). Federal reports have looked at the relationships between these more 
organized cartels and their seemingly less organized gang partners (NDIC, 2010; 
ONDCP, 2009). Also, studies have looked at how policing strategies, such as creating a 
gang unit, have affected the gang problem (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; 
Fritsch, Caeti, & Taylor, 1999). 
Mexican Drug Cartels Defined 
 Mexican drug cartels have roots dating back to the early twentieth century. This 
was a time where the United States and other countries passed laws that reduced the 
production, distribution, and consumption of alcohol and mood-altering drugs (Smith & 
Selee, 2013). Their services were desired similarly to moonshiners during the prohibition 
era. On the onset, financial gain was the primary goal of cartels. According to Shiffman, 
cartels are businesses that are vehicles for power and wealth for the individuals that run 
them (House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 2011). They only exist because of the 
massive amount of profit to be made from trafficking drugs into the United States 
(Longmire, 2011). To achieve this goal, cartels are expanding into global markets (U.S. 
Department of State, 2007). Instead of trading regular commodities, such as wheat or 
corn, cartels understand the market for illicit drugs and trade their “commodity” to gain 
wealth and power, violence just so happens to be a byproduct of business (House 
Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 2011).  
 Cartels are not restricted to drug smuggling and trafficking, but they have become 
more resilient by diversifying their means of revenue to include kidnapping, extortion, 
human smuggling and human trafficking (House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 
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2011). Not only are they proving to be a scourge in Mexico, but they are proving to have 
reach in the United States as well. Through the illicit drug trade, legal businesses are 
undermined, hurting the U.S. economy (House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, 2011). 
Cartels handle the challenge of smuggling its commodities across the border while 
leaving simple retail distribution of drugs to U.S. gangs and other lower-level affiliates 
(Smith & Selee, 2013). Mexican drug cartels are ahead of Colombian, Chinese, and 
Russian mafias in terms of the sale and distribution of cocaine, heroin, 
methamphetamine, and marijuana in the U.S. (NDIC, 2010). This has helped solidify the 
ties that cartels have with U.S. street and prison gangs (Brophy, 2008). Not only is the 
United States the primary customer for Mexico’s illicit drugs, it is also where cartels 
obtain thousands of guns and the generator of billions of dollars in drug profits 
(Longmire, 2011).  
 When President Calderon took office in 2006, he declared war on the cartels and 
violence multiplied (Grillo, 2011). Calderon’s objective was the complete atomization of 
the cartel criminal networks (Smith & Selee, 2013). He thought this could be best 
achieved by mainly targeting cartel figureheads. Calderon did not account for the 
upswing in violence as a result of the fractionalization (Smith & Selee, 2013). Once high 
profile leaders of cartels were arrested, there was a frenzy of fighting between cartels 
trying to obtain the trafficking routes that the “leaderless” cartels controlled. Not only 
were there heavy causalities amongst cartels, but there were numerous innocent civilians 
caught in the crossfire.    
 Many of the violent acts that cartels and their enforcement groups commit 
are similar in nature to those committed by terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida and the 
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IRA, and with the intentions of sending a strong message to rivals or the government 
(Longmire, 2011). Because of this, there has been increasing literature comparing 
Mexican drug cartels to these other insurgent groups. The term Insurgency is defined as 
"an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use 
of subversion and armed conflict" (Devi & Joshi, 2014, p. 3171). In regard to the 
Mexican drug cartels, the goal of their insurgency is to roll back government power, 
protect cartel assets, and show Calderon and his successors that the cartels are not to be 
held lightly (Sullivan & Elkus, 2008). In 2008, instead of using normal law enforcement 
procedures against the cartels, the Mexican army and federal police used anti-
insurgency tactics against the cartels (Longmire & Longmire, 2008). Organized crime 
literature likes to fit Mexican drug cartels under the same umbrella as other organized 
crime, but this label of “traditional organized crime” does not apply to drug cartels as 
they have evolved over recent years (Longmire, 2011, p. 176).  
 There are generally two models of how organized crime groups operate: the 
American Model and the Colombian model (Longmire, 2011). In the American model, 
groups like the Italian, Russian, and Chinese mafias operate with a civilized code of 
conduct, they like to operate under the radar, they eliminate rivals and traitors in a violent 
but discreet manner, and they make it a point to not touch family members of targets 
(Longmire, 2011). Mexican drug cartels align more with the Colombian model. In this 
model, groups combine criminal activity with insurgency against the law 
enforcement, government, and military (Longmire, 2011). Mexican drug cartels do not 
have a code of conduct and everyone is a potential target. They do not care about 
being covert, at least in Mexico. Both the United States and Mexico insist on labeling 
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Mexican drug cartels as “traditional” organized crime groups, but they are limiting 
themselves strategically by doing so (Longmire, 2011). The strategies involved with 
dealing with an insurgency are entirely different than the strategies involved with dealing 
with the mafia. In 2010, Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies passed an amendment under 
which Mexican drug cartels are designated as terrorist organizations (Longmire, 2011). 
Gangs That Engage in Drug Dealing  
 Before detailing structure, it is important to establish a definition for a “street 
gang.” There is not a consensus among researchers on the definition of street gangs. This 
paper will adopt the definition that the researchers of Eurogang programme have 
developed. Gangs model five distinctive characteristics: 1. durable over time, 2. street-
oriented lifestyle where activities are largely open to the public, 3. members around teens 
to early 20s, 4. participate in illegal activity, 5. identity stemming from illegal activities 
that group participates in (Klein & Maxson, 2006). The federal definition of a “street 
gang” is insufficient. The federal definition is broad and encompasses gangs, youth 
gangs, and street gangs, but this definition is too broad when trying to research street 
gangs specifically. Gangs are: 1. a group of three or more individuals, 2. members of 
these groups identify themselves by adopting group identifiers such as tattoos or colors, 
which are often used to illicit fear or intimidation, 3. these groups are, in part, created to 
engage in criminal activity, 4. their criminal activity revolves around enhancing the 
reputation of the gang  (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). Outlaw motorcycle gangs use 
their affiliations with legitimate motorcycle clubs as a vehicle for criminal activity and 
achieve goals through violence and intimidation (U.S. Department of Justice, 
1991). Prison gangs, as the name suggests, operate within the prison system and consist 
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of a select group of inmates who have created an organized chain of command and have 
created a code of conduct (Lyman, 1989). This type of gang attempts to control the prison 
environment through intimidation and violence geared towards other inmates (Lyman, 
1989).  
 Not all gangs are identical. On one end of the spectrum there are highly organized 
gangs with hierarchical leadership structure and on the other end there are far less 
organized gangs that are more horizontal in nature (Decker & Van Winkle, 1995). 
Membership in street gangs can be a vehicle for friendship, revenge, and a way for peer 
acceptance (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013). Making money is not a major organizational goal 
of street gangs. Membership in street gangs serves a symbolic function. Any profit from 
money seeking ventures that gang members participate in is not pooled to profit the entire 
gang, but to keep for themselves (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011).  
Organizational structure is important to look at because an organized 
infrastructure is necessary for the mass distribution of drugs. Gangs participate in many 
illegal activities such as burglary, assault, homicide, along with drug selling and many 
other endeavors. Most gangs are not formed with the primary intention to sell drugs. 
Individuals are more likely to join a gang for a sense of belonging. Highly organized and 
prepared for criminal conspiracy is a popular belief that comes with “gang” label (Howell, 
2007). This is a misnomer. The majority of gangs fall into the less organized side of the 
spectrum, incapable of handling the mass distribution of drugs. Many believe that all 
gangs are well organized and control the distribution of drugs, but this is a myth that has 
hovered over the study of gangs (Howell, 2007). That is not to say that no street gangs 
are involved in drug selling activity. More organized street gangs are more likely to 
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participate in drug selling than their less organized counterparts (Pyrooz, Decker, & 
Webb, 2014). In a recent study, juvenile gang membership was estimated to be at one 
million in the United States (Pyrooz & Sweeten, 2015). Regardless of whether these 
groups are relatively unorganized, if juvenile member numbers are combined with adult 
gang member numbers the volume of these retail transactions begin to add up.  
An increase of busts of Mexican nationals in possession of wholesale quantities of 
cocaine bricks, heroin, and crystal meth, have driven the cartels to increase their selling 
of drugs at the kilo level in order to reduce the threat of detection and reduce the risk of 
lost revenue (Grillo, 2011). This presents an obstacle when identifying the middlemen. If 
these middlemen are here illegally, they are not going to be easily identifiable. DEA 
agents have traced drugs in warehouses in Los Angeles and seen them pop up in the 
Midwest and the East coast, but it has not proved to be helpful in identifying these 
middlemen who move these drugs through corridors in the United States (Grillo, 2011). 
 The literature does not paint a clear picture of these distribution networks (Grillo, 
2011). Once the drugs are smuggled into warehouses in the United States, there is little 
that could be said about the process that moves the smuggled drugs from bulk to retail 
quantity at distribution points. Even when they arrive at these distribution points, it is not 
clear how these drugs end up in the hands of drug peddlers on street corners. There were 
multiple studies in the 1990s that looked into the level youth gangs were involved in drug 
distribution. Maxson (1995) found that gang member presence in drug distribution in two 
suburban Los Angeles cities was substantial, enough to raise the eyebrows of law 
enforcement, but not enough to cause alarm. In an Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention bulletin, Howell and Decker (1999) point out that some youth 
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gangs are actively involved in street-level drug trafficking, but they do not appear to be in 
control of the drug trafficking operations. Howell and Gleason (1999) analyzed responses 
to the 1996 National Youth Gang Survey. Of the 1,039 law enforcement agencies that 
answered the question regarding gang control of distribution, Howell and Gleason (1999) 
found that youth gangs did not control or manage most of the drug distribution in these 
jurisdictions and only 15 jurisdictions reported that gangs controlled all the distribution of 
drugs in their jurisdiction. This means there are massive chunks of the drug trade network 
that are unaccounted by law enforcement agencies. This leaves the question of who is in 
control of distribution? Howell and Decker (1999) point out that most studies of youth 
gangs that are involved in drug trafficking revolve around their street-level distribution 
and not about upper-level management and control of drug-trafficking operations. 
Research has been done about where these drugs are coming from and research has been 
done about gangs that deal these drugs, but the middle portion of how drugs trade hands 
from traffickers to the hands of sellers remains to be a mysterious black box. One thing to 
note is that these studies were done in the 1990s on the tail end of the cocaine boom of 
the 1980s and the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1990s (Fagan, 1993). Studies involving 
the drug distribution network need to be revamped to capture the nuances of the Mexican 
drug war era. 
 The informal structure of the majority of gangs does not offer enough 
infrastructure for the mass distribution of drugs. Gangs are usually spread out and 
motivated by personal interests (Decker & Curry, 2000). Most gang members, if they 
were to sell drugs, would sell drugs for themselves. The literature indicates that it is far 
more common for gang members to “freelance” as drug dealers (Decker, Bynum, & 
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Weisel, 1998). This means that if gang members were to sell drugs, they would sell them 
“on the side.” If an individual is a part of a gang, every crime they commit does not 
always have to be linked to their membership in the gang (Moreselli, 2009). Gangs are 
only organized to the extent that they fill the structural holes as drug suppliers (Decker et 
al., 1998). Street gangs are not really well organized and because of their nature they are 
not considered good business partners for organized crime groups (Decker & Pyrooz, 
2013).  Discussed further below are potential reasons why cartels overlook all of these 
characteristics and still form partnerships. 
Gangs and Traditional Organized Crime Groups 
 Because of the disorganized nature of U.S. street gangs, they make unappealing 
partners for “traditional” organized crime groups. More specifically, gangs are 
unattractive because they have a lot of public exposure and are not particularly 
specialized in any criminal offense (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013). For example, a gang can 
partake in drug sales, robbery, assault, burglary, homicide, but they would not be 
particularly specialized in any offense. A street gang can be too risky to invest in for 
organized crime groups because the gang could lack the skills.  
 Gangs and organized crime groups differ widely in purpose and structure. 
Organized crime groups are generally better organized and more focused than street 
gangs (Decker, 1996). There are five major differences between gangs and organized 
crime groups: 1. Gangs usually pursue symbolic ends, while organized crime groups 
pursue economic ends; 2. Gangs have a looser organizational structure, mostly because 
gangs’ members are younger; 3. Organized crime groups are more clandestine because 
the presence of profit-making leads to as much organization that is necessary to 
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accomplish crime without drawing attention from law enforcement while gangs 
participate in whatever they can to make profit; 4. Gangs place more importance on 
“turf” and territory than organized crime groups; 5. Discipline is a big distinguishing 
factor between gangs that sell drugs and organized crime groups, the former lacking 
discipline (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). One of the few similarities 
that gangs and organized crime groups share is economic gain being a motive for 
violence (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013). 
Why Drug Cartels and Gangs Could Work Together 
 This section attempts to address some of the concerns about gangs not being good 
partners for cartels. As mentioned in the previous section, the vast majority of gangs lack 
the capacity and infrastructure for the mass distribution of drugs. Cartels have this side of 
the business taken care of. The cartels handle the smuggling of drugs from Mexico into 
the United States and are also responsible for moving it to the major U.S. markets (Smith 
& Selee, 2013). What cartels need are feet on the ground that can take care of simple 
retail distribution that could move product on street corners.  
 Despite the literature implying that organized crime groups and gangs are widely 
different and that it would be unwise for the two to partner up, it does not mean that 
partnerships do not happen. Mexican drug cartels are a different beast and should not be 
expected to have the same logical reasoning as other organized crime groups because as 
mentioned in a previous section, Mexican drug cartels do not fall into the traditional 
organized crime umbrella.  
 There are examples of Mexican drug cartels partnering with U.S. gangs. In 1993, 
the Tijuana Cartel enlisted members of the Logan Heights gang, a U.S. street gang based 
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in San Diego, to help with the assassination of the Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera, 
the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel (Sullivan & Bunker, 2002). Although the assassination 
attempt failed, this still provides an example of Mexican drug cartels partnering with U.S. 
street gangs. If street gangs could be enlisted for the assassination of a major drug cartel 
leader, they should be able to handle the simple retail distribution of drugs. Another 
example of a U.S. street gang and Mexican drug cartel partnership is Barrio Azteca and 
the Juarez Cartel. Barrio Azteca, a street gang originating in El Paso, Texas, has been 
shown to have strong ties with the Juarez Cartel and even formed cells over in Juarez to 
deal directly with them (Grillo, 2011). They had a long history of selling drugs that the 
Juarez Cartel had been moving, which further strengthened their alliance (Grillo, 2011). 
Barrio Azteca would buy cocaine at cheaper rates while smuggling assault rifles down 
south to the Juarez Cartel (Grillo, 2011). Examples like the ones given above give reason 
for exploring relationships between cartels and street gangs.  
 Below are attempts to address some of the potential concerns about gangs not 
being good business partners for cartels. First, gangs usually pursue symbolic ends while 
organized crime groups are focused on profits (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013; Decker & 
Pyrooz, 2011). Gangs try and make a statement to rival gangs while typical organized 
crime groups are more driven towards profit (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013). Drug cartels have 
combined both of these. As seen in the skirmishes over trafficking routes, the profit 
motive has still been central because more routes means more income, but the public 
display of decapitated and mutilated bodies of rival cartel members serve as a statement 
to scare rivals and the government (Longmire & Longmire, 2008).  
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Second, gangs are said to not be good partners because their organizational 
structure is looser in nature (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). All gangs 
are organized to some extent. It is not a necessary condition for gangs to be as organized 
as drug cartels to handle simple retail distribution because if they were as organized then 
they could potentially be in the same position as cartels. Even the action of drug 
smuggling is not as highly organized as popularly believed (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). It is 
entirely possible that cartels are looking for retail distribution partners through familial 
ties in the United States as opposed to some checklist of organizational structure. A study 
of cocaine smuggling from Colombia to the Netherlands by Zaitch (2002) showed that 
ethnicity and familial relationships played an integral part of the partnership. This 
relationship was based more on informal trust and rooted relationships rather than a 
formal contractual agreement. Many of the Hispanic gangs in the United States could 
potentially have familial roots in Mexico and, by extension, with the cartels, so the major 
agreement is not necessarily through gangs, but a correspondence between family 
members. 
 Third, gangs are not good partners for organized crime groups because gangs are 
very public in nature while organized crime groups like to operate more clandestinely 
(Decker & Pyrooz, 2013; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). Drug cartels would like to stay off the 
radar in the United States, but within Mexico they are visible in nature and operate with 
little push back from authorities (Bonner, 2012). Sergeant Tommy Thompson of the 
Phoenix Police Department states: 
In the United States, the cartels want to move their drugs and make money. Police 
are a hindrance to this. But the best tactic for gangsters is to try and keep a low 
profile to get off the police radar. If they commit a murder, the police will be on 
them. If they attack the policemen themselves, authorities will go crazy. And it is 
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a lot harder in the United States to buy off officers. (Grillo, 2011, p. 244)  
 
This gives reason for drug cartels to partner up with U.S. gangs for simple retail 
distribution. If one of their gang partners is caught and implicates a cartel member, there 
is little to no way for American authorities to conduct an investigation in Mexico. It is 
less damaging to the cartels if some low-level drug peddler is caught than someone who 
is integral to the actual logistics of distribution. The bravado and violent tactics that 
cartels operate with in Mexico have proven to be difficult for Mexican authorities to deal 
with. A big concern that citizens have is that U.S. gangs could adopt cartel tactics of 
violence (Grillo, 2011). If gangs begin to operate with similar bravado as cartels, it is 
possible that U.S. law enforcement could experience the same ineffectiveness that 
Mexican authorities experience.  
 Fourth, gangs engage in multiple forms of offending and do not specialize in one 
particular form, hinting that their skills are not up to the quality required by organized 
crime groups (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013). Gangs participate in a bevy of offenses including 
drug sales, robbery, assault burglary, auto theft, intimidation, and homicide (Decker & 
Pyrooz, 2013). Mexican drug cartels also engage in multiple revenue seeking ventures. 
They do not only specialize in drug smuggling and trafficking, but human and weapons 
trafficking, kidnapping and extortion and a plethora of other revenue generating practices 
(Quinones, 2009). Drug cartels do not necessarily need gangs to help with some of the 
more nuanced offenses, but with simple retail drug sales, which more organized gangs 
have experience with (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). If desired, cartels could pull gang 
members into other operations such as the assassination attempt mentioned earlier.  
 Fifth, discipline is important for the continued successful operation of organized 
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crime groups. Organized crime groups rarely choose gangs because they are typically 
undisciplined (Decker & Pyrooz, 2013; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011). In Mexico, cartels 
subcontract local crooks to help with operations and it is not rare to “execute” these hired 
workers who step out of line (Grillo, 2011, p. 257). More scholastic research needs to be 
done on the discipline structure of Mexican drug cartels in regard to U.S. affiliates, but 
based on the brutal nature of cartels, it is not too much of a jump to conclude to that 
gangs who partner with cartels are not easily left with just a slap on the wrist when 
discipline in required.  
 For the cartels to gain profit, it is not necessary for them to have well-organized 
gangs. The cartels handle the upper level logistics while the simple peddling of drugs 
could be left to low level gang members. In a report produced by the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP, 2009), the authors identified four types of structures that 
cartels establish in the United States to help distribute their drugs. First, cartels would 
establish branch offices in the U.S. that are controlled by Mexicans in the U.S. and ran 
from Mexico. Second, a franchise gives local distribution groups more autonomy and 
control over retail sales. Third, bulk quantities of drugs to wholesale groups are supplied 
by market-based structures. Fourth, supply and demand dictate structural linkages in a 
pure market (as cited in Decker & Pyrooz, 2010).  
 The process through which the wholesale product transfers hands to the mid-level 
distributors and then to the retail-level is still murky. Unless gangs already have a close 
relationship like the Logan Heights Gang or Barrio Azteca where they can get product 
directly from the cartels, other gangs would have to go through their local distribution 
groups, franchises, to get product and this process has little to no direct coordination with 
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the cartels. This is one of the many reasons why more cartel research needs to be done. 
Many federal reports, like the one used in this study, claim that there are gangs that are 
“affiliated” with Mexican drug cartels, but the level of “affiliation” between a gang that 
does assassination missions for the cartels is different than the “affiliation” level of a 
gang that just so happened to be selling drugs that were once held by a certain drug cartel. 
This study is more speculative in nature because of this very reason; the varying levels of 
cartel “affiliation” are not available with the current data.  
Police and Community Response to Gang Problems 
It is important to look at police and community responses to gang problems 
because as shown below, media may portray an inaccurate image of the gang problem in 
certain areas, which elicits concern from viewers. Katz (2001) examined why the gang 
unit in a Midwestern city was created. The findings suggested that the gang unit was 
created as a response to community and political pressures. Once the unit was created, 
maintaining legitimacy in the community drove its response to the gang problem. This 
suggests that other gang units in other cities could have been created out of community 
pressures and driven by similar motives instead of the police department actively seeking 
to improve the department and creating an efficient strategy to combating gangs (Katz, 
2001). It is possible that a city could not be facing a legitimate gang problem, but if the 
community thinks that there is a problem they can force the hand of the necessary 
decision-makers. If the media showcases gangs that are “affiliated” with cartels, the 
community could begin to pressure law enforcement agencies and force their hand to 
become more responsive to these groups.  
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Although a district might face a genuine crime problem, police agencies could 
potentially have a vested interest in claiming that they have a gang problem or their 
current gang problem is getting worse (Bursik & Grasmik, 1995). An especially relevant 
study is Zatz' (1987) examination of the police response to gangs in Phoenix, Arizona. 
She used data from social workers, media reports, and court records and found that when 
the gang unit was created in the 1980s the city did not face a serious gang problem, but 
the police exaggerated the problem to solicit federal funding. The police along with the 
media convinced the public that Chicano gangs threatened the safety of the Anglo 
community. Through court records and social service agents, Zatz was able to prove 
otherwise.  
 When it comes to the current study, the Zatz (1987) study is important to consider 
because the drug war and the substance abuse problem in America is a priority. Law 
enforcement agencies could potentially take advantage of this fact and inflate the gang 
problem knowing that funding is readily available, especially in the case of gangs that are 
possibly affiliated with drug cartels. This study hopes to expand the literature that focuses 
on the effectiveness of policing strategies on gang activity. This study also hopes to serve 
as a stepping-stone in illuminating a clandestine cog of the drug network in America. 
Effects of Policing on Gang Activity 
 The effects of policing on “cartel affiliated” gang activity is the focal point of this 
study. There have been plenty of studies on gang activity, but little research has examined 
the organized response to the gang problem. This study hopes to shed more light on this 
topic.   
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Operation Ceasefire in Boston was based on a “pulling levers” deterrence strategy 
where resources were concentrated on chronically offending gang-involved youth (Braga, 
Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001). The thought process behind this is that a large portion 
of crime stems from smaller groups of offenders. An impact evaluation found that 
Operation Ceasefire was associated with significant decreases in youth homicide 
victimization, shots-fired calls for service, and gun assault incidents in Boston (Braga et 
al., 2001).  
Another study looked at the impact of the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative (Fritsch, 
Caeti, & Taylor, 1999). Fritsch et al. (1999) found that aggressive curfew and truancy 
enforcement led to significant reductions in gang violence, but saturation patrol did not. 
Decker and Curry (2003) evaluated the Saint Louis Anti-gang initiative and found that 
the benefit of this program did not match the amount of effort and resources that were 
devoted to this initiative. This research has been helpful when observing the effects of 
intervention strategies on gangs, but no significant research has been done on the effects 
of cartel partnerships and how they can affect the performance of law enforcement 
intervention strategies.  
There are multiple reasons why gang units are not as effective as they could be. 
Katz and Webb (2006) analyzed gang units in four large cities and found that although 
these units were commissioned to participate in community policing they were instead 
more focused on suppression and were without much direction and supervision. Most 
officers in these gang units were not specifically trained to deal with gangs and gang 
members, but were more or less left to figure it out themselves (Katz & Webb, 2006). For 
example, some officers were not trained to use computerized gang databases. Officers 
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from these units would often be called to expert advisors in community meetings or trials, 
but their discussion would largely revolve around cultural beliefs and past individual 
experience instead of empirical data (Katz & Webb, 2006). The now disbanded CRASH 
anti-gang unit of the Los Angeles Police department targeted young Latino and African-
American males because they developed the mentality that every individual of these 
racial and ethnic groups were also involved in gang activity (Katz & Webb, 2006). It has 
been shown that other gang unit officers have stopped individuals based on their “racial 
profile” instead of their actual participation in criminal activity (Katz & Webb, 2006). 
This leads to biased data and statistics on racial and ethnic minority gangs because they 
are more heavily monitored. Despite this, law enforcement agencies that have specialized 
gang units can better measure gang activity than those who do not (Katz & Webb, 
2006). They offer the best image of gang activity because officers interact with gangs and 
gang members and are able to devote to handling gang trends (Katz & Webb, 2006).  
Gangs have garnered attention from law enforcement in large part due to media 
and community pressures. This image of violent drug dealing ethnic and racial minority 
gangs have been perpetuated by films such as Colors (1988) and American Me(1992) 
(Katz & Webb, 2006). Street gangs that cluster deviant 18-25 year olds can cause fear of 
victimization in a community. According to Decker and Pyrooz (2010), even though gang 
violence is mostly directed against other gang members it is still alarming to note that 
gang homicide rates are estimated at up to 100 times that of the normal population. Many 
police departments have created gang units dedicated to dealing with their jurisdiction’s 
gang problem. The Arizona Gang Threat Assessment, the data source for this study, looks 
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at the type of intervention strategies that law enforcement agencies use to combat gangs, 
gang units being one of those strategies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 One way to think of criminal decision-making is a cost-benefit analysis. 
Deterrence theory notes that crimes can be impeded when the costs of committing the 
offense are perceived by the offender to outweigh the benefits of committing the crime 
(Gibbs, 1975; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). Deterrence is a two-fold mechanism, 
encompassing “general” and “specific” deterrence (Cook, 1980). General deterrence is a 
mechanism that deters the general population from committing certain crimes while 
specific deterrence is geared towards preventing specific offenders from offending in the 
future. For the purposes of this study, intervention strategies will act as both general and 
specific deterrents. Intervention strategies, practiced by law enforcement agencies in the 
state of Arizona, have the goal of reducing gang activity.  
 Prior research has had a difficult time pinning down a theoretical framework 
when trying to explain the police’s official response to gang activity. Neither the Braga et 
al. (2001) study nor the Fritsch et al. (1999) piece offers any hints in regard to theoretical 
framework. There has been little consensus on the reason why specialized gang units are 
created (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002). The most discussed theories of gang unit 
creation are: contingency theory, social threat theory, and resource dependency theory. 
Contingency theorists contend that organizations are developed and arranged to achieve 
desired goals (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Mastrofski, 1998). These organizations 
continually seek to improve efficiency and performance (Mastrofski & Ritti, 2000). Once 
these organizations become inefficient or they are not achieving goals, then they change 
structures to adapt to regain efficiency (Donaldson, 1995). In regard to the creation of 
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gang units, those police agencies with higher levels of gang activity would create gang 
units to improve efficiency when dealing with gang issues or achieving goals that are 
gang-focused (Jackson & McBride, 1985; Burns & Deakin, 1989; Huff & McBride, 
1990; Rush, 1996; Weisel & Painter, 1997). For social threat theory, police departments 
create gang units as a response to the perceived threat that the dominant group feels from 
minority groups (McCorkle & Miethe, 1998; Zatz, 1987). For example, the gang unit in 
Phoenix was created in the 1980s because the public was convinced by the media and the 
police that Chicano gangs threatened the safety of the Anglo community (Zatz, 1987). In 
resource dependency theory, organizations understand that they need resources to 
survive. Organizations form symbiotic relationships with other organizations to exchange 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Where these exchanges exist, organizations change 
their structure or behavior to ensure the flow of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). By 
creating a gang unit, law enforcement agencies are sending beaconing that they have a 
gang problem and need more resources (Katz et al., 2002).   
 This study will adopt structural contingency theory (Donaldson, 1996) when 
trying to explain police responsiveness to gang activity. Contingency theory maintains 
that organizations must modify their structures to appropriately acknowledge to their 
unique environments (Zhao, 1996). So in theory, if police agencies have gang problems 
in their jurisdiction they will respond to them by implementing gang intervention 
strategies to be more effective in dealing with the gang issue. If they do not have a 
significant gang problem, then they do not necessarily have to adapt.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESIS 
 This study is more speculative in nature because the exact quality of ties 
between “cartel affiliated" gangs is not known with the current data. Ideally, policing 
strategies would have a negative relationship on levels of U.S. gang activity; as 
enforcement increases or becomes more stringent, the level of gang activity decreases, or 
at least keeps stable (Huff & McBride, 1993; Owens & Wells, 1993; Rush, 1996). Four 
sets of hypotheses will be explored. Hypothesis one and three will determine if there is a 
relationship between the variables in question and hypothesis two and four will determine 
if that relationship differs for “cartel affiliated” gangs and non-cartel affiliated gangs. The 
hypotheses are as follows:  
 H1: Anti-gang law enforcement strategies reduce gang activity. 
 H2: Anti-gang law enforcement strategies are less effective for “cartel affiliated”  
 gang activity than they are for non-cartel affiliated gangs.  
 H3: Law enforcement agencies respond to higher gang activity by increasing anti- 
 gang intervention strategies.  
 H4: Law enforcement agencies are more responsive to “cartel affiliated” gang  
 activity than they are to non-cartel affiliated gang activity.  
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS 
Data 
 Due to the nature of the Arizona Gang Threat Assessment (GTA) survey, the unit 
of analysis for this study are law enforcement agencies in the state of Arizona. This study 
seeks to determine the relationship between law enforcement intervention strategies and 
the activity of U.S. gangs in Arizona. The Arizona GTA asks every law enforcement 
agency in the state of Arizona the level of gang activity in their jurisdiction1. When it 
comes to police gathering gang activity data, the size of the population of the population 
that the law enforcement agency serves and the where the agencies are located are 
environmental variables that effect the potential bias (Katz, Fox, Britt, Stevenson, 2012). 
What has been found in prior research has been that larger jurisdictions are more likely to 
have gang problems (Klein & Maxson, 2006) and these agencies are more likely to be 
large themselves and have the proper structural mechanisms to record gang activity to 
some extent (Katz et al., 2002).  
 The survey has a list of roughly 27 gangs2 that the respondent from the agency 
will respond with the level of activity that specific gang has in their jurisdiction. Using an 
identifying list of U.S. gangs that are “affiliated” with Mexican drug cartels from the 
FBI’s 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2010), 
                                                 
Notes 
1 In regard to data on the number of gangs, gang members, and gang homicides recorded by law 
enforcement agencies across the United States, it is fairly robust and is generally reliable enough to be used 
by policymakers and academics (Katz et al., 2012).  
 
2 The number of gangs examined in each survey fluctuated depending on the year the survey was taken, but 
the number of gangs stayed roughly around the 27 mark. They include street gangs, outlaw motorcycle 
gangs, and prison gangs.  
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the author has compiled a list of gangs in the Arizona GTA that will be the focus of the 
analysis. Of these 27 gangs in the Arizona GTA, 10 are from the FBI’s National Gang 
Threat Assessment list of “cartel affiliated” gangs. The degree of this affiliation is still 
murky. These U.S. gangs include: Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-
13), Hells Angels, Bandidos, Mexican Mafia, Texas Mexican Mafia (Mexikanemi), Texas 
Syndicate, La Nuestra Familia. The effects of policing strategies on the level of activity 
of these 10 gangs will be described and analyzed using the 2009 and 2010 survey data. 
The 2008 data was not used because it was filled with more open-ended questions and the 
responses that were most commonly referred to were aggregated to become standardized 
measures for later surveys. The 2012 data were not used because it did not include some 
gangs that were included in the 2009 and 2010 survey. The 2007 data was not provided 
by the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission.  
 The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission (AZCJC) is a statutorily mandated 
entity that is authorized to research the various administration and management of 
criminal justice programs in the state of Arizona. The Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) 
is the research arm of the AZCJC and is the one that administers the Arizona GTA. The 
SAC is the state equivalent of the national Bureau of Justice Statistics. The target 
population of the survey is law enforcement agencies in the state of Arizona. These 
surveys were sent out to county sheriff’s offices, municipal police agencies, marshals, 
and tribal police departments. The chief would be asked to fill out the survey3. Law 
enforcement agencies are not mandated by the state to fill out the Arizona GTA. 
                                                 
 
3 Or someone the chief appoints that is knowledgeable of the jurisdiction’s gang activity and is capable of 
filling out the survey.  
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Researchers from the SAC try to assure a response by letting the agencies know the 
importance of the survey and the positives that could come out of it. In spite of this, the 
Arizona GTA has seen a decline in response rates every year. In 2009, they sent 113 
surveys and received 81 back (71.68%). One of the first questions asked is if the agency 
has gang activity in their jurisdiction, and if they do not then the agency does not fill the 
rest of the survey. Of the 81 agencies that returned their surveys back, 19 marked that 
they did not have gang activity in their jurisdiction, leaving the sample size of this study 
to the 62 agencies that had activity and filled out the rest of the survey. Follow-up 
surveys, emails, and phone calls are sent to the agencies to improve the response rates, 
but the rates are still declining.  
Table 5.1 Arizona Gang Threat Assessment Response Rate 
Year Surveys Sent Received (%) 
Marked “Yes” for 
Gang Activity 
2008 113 99 (87.61%) 69 (69.70%) 
2009 113 81 (71.68%) 62 (76.54%) 
2010 111 64 (57.66%) 46 (71.88%) 
2012 109 64 (58.72%) 50 (78.12%) 
 
 The decreasing response rate is a limitation of the study because reporting of gang 
activity in the state becomes less accurate. The survey data is broken down into the 15 
counties of Arizona and this response rate can affect the accuracy of the gang activity 
image in these counties. For example, high response rates would be pivotal in a small 
county like Greenlee, which has only two law enforcement agencies. If agency A does 
not respond and agency B marks that it has moderate levels of gang activity, then the 
county would be labeled as having moderate levels of gang activity where it could be 
entirely possible that the district agency A covers has zero gang activity, thus lowering 
the average of gang activity in the county.  
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 The years that these surveys have been administered are significant. The drug 
cartels in Mexico had a relatively undisturbed existence in their country for decades until 
their president from 2006-2012, Felipe Calderón, decided to launch an initiative to 
eradicate the cartels from his country (Grillo, 2011). These years have seen a massive 
upswing in visible cartel activity and their public desire to trade in the United States. 
Coincidentally, the dates the surveys were administered were 2008, 2009, 2010, and 
2012; the same time frame as the Mexican Drug War. Activity should be different among 
gangs that are “affiliated” with cartels versus their non-affiliated counterparts.  
Measures 
 Each agency is asked how much gang activity is in their jurisdiction. These 
responses are based on a Likert scale of “High”, “Moderate”, “Low”, “None” and 
“Unknown”. In the survey data, these numbers were originally coded as 1 = High, 2 = 
Moderate, 3 = Low, 4 = None, and 5 = Unknown. For ease of interpretation, “None” and 
“Unknown” were combined and the scales were reversed, now 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 
= Low, 0 = None/Unknown. The reason for combining “None” and “Unknown” is 
because these measures are not perfectly ordinal. If the author were to keep the measures 
as is then there would have been an assumption that the distance between “High” and 
“Moderate” is the same as “None” and “Unknown”. By combining these two, the author 
is assuming that it is the most appropriate to couple these two as opposed to any other 
value because an “Unknown” value is more likely to be closer to “None” as opposed to 
“High” because if the “Unknown” level of activity were truly high then it should have 
been noticed by local law enforcement. The reason for reversing the number of the 
coding is because it is more intuitive to conceptualize higher rates of crime with larger 
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numbers. The amount of missing data for the measure of number of gang members will 
result in a loss of statistical power. Researchers may be less likely to detect a causal 
relationship when one exists (Katz et al., 2012).  
 Some might argue that having “Unknown” as a response choice is unnecessary, 
but the author contends that it is important to capture this. Some counties are smaller and 
have less funding. It is possible that these small counties, like Santa Cruz, do not have the 
capability to capture gang activity in their district as a larger county, like Maricopa, has. 
These small counties can suffer from furtive gang operations, but just do not have 
resources to identify them. Table 5.2 shows the amount of law enforcement agencies that 
marked “Unknown” for each gang in this study. The 2010 data suffers the most because 
of its lower response rate. It would be interesting to see if the agencies from smaller 
counties are the ones that are more often marking the “Unknown” response. If this is the 
case then it is important to give these counties adequate gang identifying resources 
because cognizant cartel operations can become keen to this fact. 
Table 5.2 Agencies Responding “Unknown” for Listed Gang 
Gangs 
2009 
N=62 
2010 
N=46 
Bloods 7 (11.29%) 4 (8.70%) 
Crips 6 (9.68%) 2 (4.35%) 
Latin Kings 7 (11.29%) 4 (8.70%) 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 8 (12.90%) 5 (10.87%) 
Mexican Mafia 7 (11.29%) 4 (8.70%) 
Texas Mexican Mafia 
(Mexikanemi) 
11 (17.74%) 6 (13.04%) 
Texas Syndicate 12 (19.35%) 5 (10.87%) 
La Nuestra Familia 12 (19.35%) 7 (15.22%) 
Hells Angels 4 (6.45%) 5 (10.87%) 
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Table 5.2 Agencies Responding “Unknown” for Listed Gang, Continued 
Gangs 
2009 
N=62 
2010 
N=46 
Bandidos 7 (11.29%) 7 (15.22%) 
UBN (United Blood 
Nation) 
13 (16.05%) 11 (23.91%) 
Vice Lords 11 (20.97%) 6 (13.04%) 
Almighty Black P. Stone 
Nation 
10 (16.13%) 6 (13.04%) 
Sureños 3 (4.84%) 1 (2.17%) 
Norteños 5 (8.06%) 3 (6.52%) 
18th Street Gang 6 (9.68%) 5 (10.87%) 
La Raza 7 (11.29%) 8 (17.39%) 
Border Brothers 6 (9.68%) 4 (8.70%) 
Pagans 7 (11.29%) 6 (13.04%) 
Outlaws 8 (12.90%) 10 (21.74%) 
 
 Using these responses, new variables were created. For this study, the author 
looked at how the activity level of “cartel affiliated” gangs in 2009 and 2010 were 
affected by intervention strategies. The author will also use the other gangs in the survey 
that have not been identified as cartel affiliated as a control group for comparison. 
Table 5.3 “Cartel Affiliated” and Non-Cartel Affiliated Gangs 
“Cartel Affiliated” Gangs 
N=10 
Non-Cartel Affiliated Gangs 
N=10 
Bloods UBN (United Blood Nation) 
Crips Vice Lords 
Latin Kings Almighty Black P. Stone Nation 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) Sureños 
Mexican Mafia Norteños 
Texas Mexican Mafia (Mexikanemi) 18th Street Gangs 
Texas Syndicate La Raza 
La Nuestra Familia Border Brothers 
Hells Angels Pagans 
Bandidos Outlaws 
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Table 5.4 Gangs Not “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2009 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low  
= 1 
Moderate  
= 2 
High  
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Sureños 
11  
(18.64%) 
14 
(23.73%) 
20  
(33.90%) 
14  
(23.73%) 
59 
Norteños 
28  
(47.46%) 
23 
(38.98%) 
6  
(10.17%) 
2  
(3.39%) 
59 
Border 
Brothers  
40  
(68.97%) 
16 
(27.59%) 
2  
(3.45%) 
— 58 
Outlaws 
49  
(84.48%) 
7  
(12.07%) 
2  
(3.45%) 
— 58 
18th Street 
Gang 
42  
(71.19%) 
16 
(27.12%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
— 59 
Vice Lords 
52  
(88.14%) 
6  
(10.17%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
— 59 
UBN 
(United 
Blood 
Nation) 
52  
(89.66%) 
5  
(8.62%) 
1  
(1.72%) 
— 58 
Almighty 
Black P. 
Stone 
Nation 
55  
(93.22%) 
4  
(6.78%) 
— — 59 
La Raza 
51  
(86.44%) 
8  
(13.56%) 
— — 59 
Pagans 
53  
(91.38%) 
5  
(8.62%) 
— — 58 
 
Table 5.5 Gangs “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2009 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low 
= 1 
Moderate 
= 2 
High 
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Bloods 
22  
(37.29%) 
20 
(33.90%) 
9  
(15.25%) 
8  
(13.56%) 
59 
Crips 
22  
(37.29%) 
17 
(28.81%) 
11  
(18.64%) 
9  
(15.25%) 
59 
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Table 5.5 Gangs “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2009, Continued 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low 
= 1 
Moderate 
= 2 
High 
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Mexican 
Mafia 
20  
(33.90%) 
23 
(38.98%) 
9  
(15.25%) 
7  
(11.86%) 
59 
Hells Angels 
21  
(35.59%) 
19 
(32.20%) 
16  
(27.12%) 
3  
(5.08%) 
59 
Latin Kings 
40  
(67.80%) 
18 
(30.51%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
— 59 
Mara 
Salvatrucha 
(MS-13) 
31  
(52.54%) 
25 
(42.37%) 
3  
(5.08%) 
— 59 
Bandidos 
47  
(79.66%) 
11 
(18.64%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
— 59 
La Nuestra 
Familia 
50  
(84.75%) 
7  
(11.86%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
1  
(1.69%) 
59 
Texas 
Syndicate 
57  
(96.61%) 
2  
(3.39%) 
— — 59 
Texas 
Mexican 
Mafia 
(Mexikanemi) 
57  
(98.28%) 
1  
(1.72%) 
— — 58 
 
Table 5.6 Gangs Not “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2010 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low  
= 1 
Moderate  
= 2 
High  
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Sureños 
9  
(20.00%) 
14 
(31.11%) 
8  
(17.78%) 
14  
(31.11%) 
45 
Norteños 
19  
(42.22%) 
18 
(40.00%) 
5  
(11.11%) 
3  
(6.67%) 
45 
Border 
Brothers  
31  
(86.36%) 
12 
(26.67%) 
2  
(4.44%) 
— 45 
Outlaws 
38  
(84.48%) 
6  
(13.64%) 
— — 44 
18th Street 
Gang 
32  
(72.73%) 
12 
(27.27%) 
— — 44 
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Table 5.6 Gangs Not “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2010, Continued 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low  
= 1 
Moderate  
= 2 
High  
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Vice Lords 
40  
(88.89%) 
4  
(8.89%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
— 45 
UBN 
(United 
Blood 
Nation) 
41  
(93.18%) 
1  
(2.27%) 
1  
(2.27%) 
1  
(2.27%) 
44 
Almighty 
Black P. 
Stone 
Nation 
43  
(95.56%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
— 45 
La Raza 
39  
(88.64%) 
3  
(6.82%) 
— 
2  
(4.55%) 
44 
Pagans 
44  
(97.78%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
— — 45 
 
Table 5.7 Gangs “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2010 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low  
= 1 
Moderate  
= 2 
High  
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
Bloods 
13  
(28.89%) 
13 
(28.89%) 
9  
(20.00%) 
10  
(22.22%) 
45 
Crips 
11  
(24.44%) 
14 
(31.11%) 
12  
(26.67%) 
8  
(17.78%) 
45 
Mexican 
Mafia 
15  
(33.33%) 
12 
(26.67%) 
8  
(17.78%) 
10  
(22.22%) 
45 
Hells Angels 
16  
(35.56%) 
17 
(37.78%) 
11  
(24.44%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
45 
Latin Kings 
25  
(56.82%) 
18 
(40.91%) 
1  
(2.27%) 
— 44 
Mara 
Salvatrucha 
(MS-13) 
22  
(50.00%) 
22 
(50.00%) 
— — 44 
Bandidos 
39  
(86.67%) 
5  
(11.11%) 
1  
(2.22%) 
— 45 
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Table 5.7 Gangs “Affiliated” with Drug Cartels, 2010, Continued 
Gangs 
None/Unknown 
= 0 
Low  
= 1 
Moderate  
= 2 
High  
= 3 
Number of 
Agencies 
La Nuestra 
Familia 
39  
(90.70%) 
4  
(9.30%) 
— — 43 
Texas 
Syndicate 
41  
(93.18%) 
2  
(4.55%) 
1  
(2.27%) 
— 44 
Texas 
Mexican 
Mafia 
(Mexikanemi) 
42  
(93.33%) 
3  
(6.67%) 
— — 45 
 
 This study uses dummy variable regression, change score analysis, and 
multinomial logistic regression. Dependent and independent variables vary according to 
which analysis is being looked at. 
 Dummy Variable Regression. 
 The point of a multivariate regression is to estimate the relationships among the 
variables. In this study, the author used a dummy variable regression to estimate the 
relationship of intervention strategies on the level of gang activity. Using Stata, the 
author generated a new variable, Ogang09, which combined all the gangs in the study 
(listed above) and divided it by the total number of gangs, 20. This gets an overall 
average of gang activity. The author then generated a “cartel affiliated” gang variable, 
Cgang09, which combined all the cartel affiliated gangs in the study and divided it by the 
total number of gangs in the group, 10. This gets an overall average of gang activity for 
“cartel affiliated” gangs. The final variable generated was one for the non-cartel affiliated 
gangs. Ngang09 combined all the non-cartel affiliated gangs in the study and divided it 
by the total number of gangs in the group, 10. This gets an overall average of gang 
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activity for non-cartel affiliated gangs. The Ngang group is a control group and gives the 
Cgang group something to compare to. This process was then done for the 2010 data and 
labeled accordingly. The newly generated variables are the dependent variables.  
Table 5.8 2009 Gang Activity Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Ogang 09 32 0.552 0.371 0.05 1.55 
Cgang 09 35 0.651 0.405 0.10 1.60 
Ngang 09 33 0.458 0.394           0.00 1.50 
 
Table 5.9 2010 Gang Activity Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Ogang 10 33 0.539  0.342        0.00 1.30 
Cgang 10 34 0.676  0.417 0.00 1.50 
Ngang 10 35 0.380     0.331          0.00 1.60 
 
 The effects that law enforcement intervention strategies have on gang activity will 
then be assessed. Each law enforcement agency is asked if they use nine different types 
of enforcement strategies. The responses are recorded as simple binary variables of “Yes” 
or “No”. These nine different types of enforcement strategies, tactics, programs and 
strategies which include: “Law Enforcement”, “Identification of Gang Members”, 
“GIITEM4”, “Joint Efforts with Other Agencies”, “Gang Crime/Intelligence Data 
Analysis”, “Law Enforcement Gang Units”, “School Programs”, “Community 
Programs”, and “Special Prosecution Programs”. The usual coding of binary responses is 
1 = Yes and 0 = No. These will be grouped as strategies for the remainder of the study. 
The issue with this portion of the data was that it was coded where 1 = Yes and a period 
                                                 
Notes 
4 GIITEM stands for “Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission.” It is a statewide 
multi-agency task force that consists of five districts. It provides gang and illegal immigration enforcement 
and intelligence services. 
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equaled “No”. This is problematic when trying to perform regression models on the data. 
This portion of the data had to be recoded so that 0 = No. A table for the frequency that 
law enforcement agencies mark that they do practice a certain intervention strategy is 
included. 
Table 5.10 Gang Intervention Strategies Practiced by Law Enforcement Agencies 
 
2009 
N=62 
2010 
N=46 
Intervention Strategy Number of Agencies Number of Agencies 
Law Enforcement 
47 
(75.81%) 
40 
(88.89%) 
Identification of Gang 
Members 
40 
(64.52%) 
38 
(84.44%) 
GIITEM 
36 
(58.06%) 
31 
(68.89%) 
Joint Efforts with Other 
Agencies 
30 
(48.39%) 
27 
(60.00%) 
Gang Crime/Intelligence 
Analyses 
22 
(35.48%) 
21 
(46.67%) 
Law Enforcement Gang 
Units 
20 
(32.26%) 
19 
(42.22%) 
School Programs 
17 
(27.42%) 
12 
(26.67%) 
Special Prosecution 
Programs 
13 
(20.97%) 
8 
(17.78%) 
Community Programs 
8 
(12.90%) 
11 
(24.44%) 
 
 The independent variables are dummy variables. A new variable was created to 
capture the departments that increased their number of anti-gang strategies from 2009 to 
2010, Increased. A second dummy variable was created to capture the departments that 
had no change in their number of anti-gang strategies from 2009 to 2010, NoChange. A 
third variable was created to capture the departments that decreased their number of anti-
gang strategies from 2009 to 2010, Decreased. By regressing the 2010 gang variables 
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with dummy variables, the reader could potentially see if the changes in anti-gang 
strategies were related to the 2010 gang activity.  
Table 5.11 Intervention Strategies Changed Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
NoChange 47 0.255     0.441           0 1 
Increased 47 0.426     0.500           0 1 
Decreased 47 0.319 0.471          0 1 
 
Change Score. 
 Change scores for Ogang, Cgang, and Ngang were created for the second 
analysis. For example, subtracting Ogang09 from Ogang10 will net the change score for 
Ogang. This was done for the other gang variables as well. The dummy variables above 
were then regressed on the change scores. The change scores are the dependent variables 
while the dummy variables are the independent variables. This will determine if the 
changes in anti-gang strategies are related to changes in gang activity.  
Table 5.12 Change Score Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max 
ChangeOgang 27 -.0740741      .349827 -1 .7 
ChangeCgang 31 -.0451613     .3845679   -1    1 
ChangeNgang 29 -.1206897     .3478293          -1 .5 
 
 Multinomial Logistic Regression. 
 A multinomial logistic model is used to see if the surveyed law enforcement 
departments are responsive to the level of gang activity they are reporting. The Increased, 
NoChange, and Decreased dummy variables would be the dependent variables and the 
2009 gang variables would be the independent variables. The dummy variables were 
combined to create a new categorical variable, Changed. This analysis could help 
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determine whether or not the jurisdictions with higher levels of gang activity respond by 
increasing their levels of intervention strategies.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
Dummy Variable Regression 
 Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics for Ogang10. NoChange means that the 
amount of intervention strategies that law enforcement agencies remained the same 
between 2009 and 2010. Increased means that the amount of intervention strategies that 
law enforcement agencies went up in number from 2009 to 2010. Decreased means that 
the amount of intervention strategies that law enforcement agencies went down from 
2009 to 2010. For example, the mean Ogang10 score for the 14 law enforcement 
agencies that increased in intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 was 0.554. The mean 
Ogang10 score for the 5 law enforcement agencies that did not change the amount of 
intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 was 0.760. A lower mean translates to lower 
levels of gang activity. As a reminder, the Likert scale was recoded to 0-3, 0 being 
none/unknown and 3 being high in gang activity.  
Table 6.1 Summary of Ogang10 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N=33 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
0.760 0.160 5 
0.554 0.353 14 
0.446 0.357 14 
0.539 0.342 33 
 
 Table 6.2 shows the summary statistics for Cgang10 and the changing 
intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010.  
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Table 6.2 Summary of Cgang10 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N=34 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
0.980 0.277 5 
0.667 0.478 15 
0.579 0.356 14 
0.676 0.417 34 
 
 Table 6.3 shows the summary statistics for Ngang10 and the changing 
intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010. 
Table 6.3 Summary of Ngang10 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N=35 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
0.540 0.114 5 
0.400 0.280 15 
0.307 0.410 15 
0.380 0.331 35 
 
 Table 6.4 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or decreasing 
their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on all the gangs in 2010, which is variable 
Ogang10. Since this is a secondary data analysis just analyzing two years worth of data 
with a small amount of observations, it is difficult to tease out causal relationships and 
get significant results. With such a small sample size, the alpha level will be changed to 
.10. One coefficient is considered significant at the .10 level. If law enforcement agencies 
decreased their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010, then the level of overall gang 
activity decreases by 0.314 units. This is contrary to deterrence theory. If law 
enforcement agencies decrease the amount of intervention strategies they practice, then 
the expected result, according to deterrence theory, would be an increase in gang activity, 
not a decrease in gang activity. This does not support the first hypothesis. Also note, the 
entire model should be interpreted with caution because the overall F statistic is not 
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significant. This caution also applies to the other models in the dummy variable 
regression section.  
Table 6.4 Ogang10 and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable b SE t statistic p value 
Increased -0.206  0.175      -1.18 0.247 
Decreased -0.314*    0.175     -1.80 0.083 
Constant 0.760    0.150 5.07 0.000 
N = 33, Adj. R2 =  0.0381, F = 1.63, p = 0.2122 
*p<.10 
 
 Table 6.5 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or decreasing 
their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on “cartel affiliated” gangs in 2010, which 
is variable Cgang10. One coefficient is considered significant at the .10 level. If law 
enforcement agencies decreased their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010, then the 
level of “cartel affiliated” gang activity decreases by 0.401 units. These gangs were 
expected to act with more bravado by being affiliated with cartels making intervention 
strategies less effective against them, but this table presents a different picture. This 
finding does not support the second hypothesis that intervention strategies are less 
effective on “cartel affiliated” gangs. 
Table 6.5 Cgang10 and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable B SE t statistic p value 
Increased -0.313 0.210 -1.49 0.146 
Decreased -0.401*    0.212  -1.89 0.068 
Constant 0.980     0.182  5.38 0.000 
N = 34, Adj. R2 =  0.0460, F = 1.80, p = 0.1827 
*p<.10 
 
 Table 6.6 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or decreasing 
their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on non-cartel affiliated gangs, which is 
variable Ngang10. The results are not considered significant. 
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Table 6.6 Ngang10 and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable Coefficient SE t statistic p value 
Increased -0.140 0.171 -0.82 0.419 
Decreased -0.233 0.171  -1.37 0.181 
Constant 0.540 0.148     3.65 0.001 
N = 35 Adj. R2 =  -0.0011, F = 0.98, p = 0.3859 
*p<.10 
 
Change Score Analysis 
 The point of a change score analysis is to determine if changes in the dependent 
variable from time 1 to time 2 are related to changes in the independent variable from 
time 1 to time 2. In this instance, a change score analysis could help determine if the 
increases or decreases in intervention strategies are related to the changes in gang 
activity.  
 Table 6.7 shows the summary statistics for ChangeOgang. NoChange means that 
the amount of intervention strategies that law enforcement agencies remained the same 
between 2009 and 2010. Increased means that the amount of intervention strategies that 
law enforcement agencies went up in number from 2009 to 2010. Decreased means that 
the amount of intervention strategies that law enforcement agencies went down from 
2009 to 2010. For example, the mean ChangeOgang score for the 11 law enforcement 
agencies that increased in intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 was 0.100. As a 
reminder for the reader, the change score variables in this section is a function that 
subtracts 2009 gang activity from 2010 gang activity. Negative averages in this column 
mean that gang activity was higher in 2009 than 2010.  
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Table 6.7 Summary of ChangeOgang 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N = 27 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
-0.080 0.340 5 
0.100 0.311 11 
-0.245 0.331 11 
-0.074 0.350 27 
 
 Table 6.8 shows the summary statistics for ChangeCgang and the changing 
intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010. Those who increased their intervention 
strategies from 2009 to 2010 had higher levels of “cartel affiliated” gang activity in 2010 
than in 2009. This could mean that increasing intervention strategies is positively related 
to changes in gang activity.  
Table 6.8 Summary of ChangeCgang 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N = 31 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
0.040 0.182 5 
0.086 0.372 14 
-0.233 0.405 12 
-0.045 0.385 31 
 
 Table 6.9 shows the summary statistics for ChangeNgang and the changing 
intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010. Those who increased their intervention 
strategies from 2009 to 2010 had lower levels of non-cartel affiliated gang activity in 
2010 than in 2009. This could mean that increasing intervention strategies is negatively 
related to changes in gang activity.  
Table 6.9 Summary of ChangeNgang 
Response Mean SD 
Frequency 
N = 29 
NoChange 
Increased 
Decreased 
Total 
-0.200 0.505 5 
0.000 0.311 13 
-0.227 0.294 11 
-0.121 0.348 29 
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 Table 6.10 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or 
decreasing their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on the change score between 
all the gangs in 2009 and 2010, which is variable ChangeOgang. Even with changing the 
alpha level to .10, there are no significant results. These findings should definitely be 
tempered because the p values are not significant and the overall F statistic for the model 
is also not significant. 
Table 6.10 ChangeOgang and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable b SE t statistic p value 
Increased 0.180 0.175      1.03 0.314 
Decreased -0.165 0.175 -0.95 0.354 
Constant -0.080 0.145 -0.55 0.586 
N = 27, Adj. R2 = 0.1402, F = 3.12, p = 0.0625 
*p<.10 
 
 Table 6.11 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or 
decreasing their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on the change score between 
all the cartel “affiliated” gangs in 2009 and 2010, which is variable ChangeCgang. Much 
like above, these results are diluted considering the lack of significant p values. 
Table 6.11 ChangeCgang and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable b SE t statistic p value 
Increased 0.046   0.190 0.24 0.812 
Decreased -0.273 0.194 -1.41 0.171 
Constant -0.114 0.143     -0.24 0.808 
N = 31, Adj. R2 = 0.0978, F = 2.63 p = 0.0900 
*p<.10 
 
 Table 6.12 shows the effects of law enforcement agencies increasing or 
decreasing their intervention strategies from 2009 to 2010 on the change score between 
all the non-cartel affiliated gangs in 2009 and 2010, which is variable ChangeNgang. The 
results are not considered significant. 
  45 
Table 6.12 ChangeNgang and Increased & Decreased Regression 
Variable Coefficient SE t statistic p value 
Increased 0.200    0.180     1.11 0.277 
Decreased -0.027  0.184  -0.15 0.884 
Constant -0.200  0.153     -1.31 0.202 
N = 29, Adj. R2 = 0.0330, F = 1.48, p = 0.2457 
*p<.10 
 
 Confidence intervals also play a part in determining where the effects lie. None of 
the models had a 95% confidence interval that did not contain zero. This makes it 
difficult to see where the effect lies. These models do not contain statistically significant 
results, and so provide no evidence to prove if the increases or decreases in intervention 
strategies are related to the changes in gang activity.  
Multinomial Logistic Regression  
 A multinomial logistic model is used to test the third and fourth hypotheses. This 
model will allow the reader to see if the surveyed law enforcement departments are 
responsive to the level of gang activity they are reporting. The coefficients in these 
models tell the reader that a one unit increase in the reported gang problems changes the 
odds of expanding the number of intervention strategies. The categorical variable will be 
0 if law enforcement agencies decreased intervention strategies, a 1 if law enforcement 
agencies maintained the same amount of intervention strategies, and a 2 if law 
enforcement agencies increased in intervention strategies. In the models, no change in the 
number of enforcement strategies represents the base outcome.  
 Table 6.13 shows odds of law enforcement agencies being responsive, Changed, 
to all the gang activity in 2009, which is Ogang09. For example, if law enforcement 
agencies reported a 1 unit increase in all gang activity then the odds of them decreasing 
intervention strategies is -1.638. If law enforcement agencies reported 1 unit increase in 
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all gang activity then the odds of them maintaining the same amount of intervention 
strategies is 2.716. With such a small sample size, the alpha level will be changed to .10. 
With the alpha level at .10, a coefficient in the Increased category is considered 
significant because the p-value is .038. This means that if law enforcement agencies 
reported a 1 unit increase in all gang activity then the odds of them increasing 
interventions strategies is -3.477. According to structural contingency theory, police 
agencies will change their organizations to reflect changes in their environment. If they 
see increases in gang activity, then the odds they will respond by increasing their 
intervention strategies is negative.   
Table 6.13 Changed and Ogang09 Multinomial Regression 
  Coefficient SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
Ogang09 -1.638 1.516 -1.08 0.280 -4.610     1.334 
Constant 1.972 1.276 1.55 0.122 -0.528 4.473 
1 (base outcome) 
2 
Ogang09 -3.477**    1.672 -2.08 0.038 -6.753 
-
0.200 
Constant 3.287    1.275 2.58 0.010 0.788     5.785 
N = 32, Pseudo R2 = 0.0901, LR Chi2(2) = 5.79, Prob> Chi2 = 0.0553 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
 
 Table 6.14 shows the margins for the multinomial regression model in table 6.13. 
If a law enforcement agency reports no gang activity for the 20 gangs in this study, when 
Ogang09 equals zero, then there is a 21 percent chance that the law enforcement agency 
will decrease their intervention strategies, 3 percent chance of no change in intervention 
strategies, and 77 percent chance that they will increase the number of gang intervention 
strategies. On the other hand, if law enforcement agencies report a relatively high level of 
gang activity, when Ogang09 equals one, then they are more likely to decrease the 
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number of gang intervention strategies (43 percent) and less likely to increase (26 
percent). Potential reasons will be discussed below.  
Table 6.14 Changed and Ogang09 Margins 
Outcome Values Margin SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
0 0.206*    0.125      1.65 0.099 -0.039 0.450 
.5 0.357****    0.091      3.93 0.000 0.179 0.536 
1 0.433***    0.142      3.05 0.002 0.155 0.712 
1.5 0.350    0.265      1.32 0.187 -0.170 0.869 
1 
0 0.029    0.034      0.83 0.404 -0.039 0.096 
.5 0.113*    0.064      1.77 0.077 -0.012 0.238 
1 0.310**      0.135      2.30 0.021 0.046 0.574 
1.5 0.568*   0.295      1.92 0.055 -0.011 1.147 
2 
0 0.766****    0.133      5.74 0.000 0.504 1.027 
.5 0.530****    0.095      5.56 0.000 0.343 0.717 
1 0.256*    0.131      1.95 0.051 -0.001 0.514 
1.5 0.083   0.098      0.84 0.399 -0.109 0.274 
N=32 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
 
 Table 6.15 shows odds of law enforcement agencies being responsive, Changed, 
to the “cartel affiliated” gang activity in 2009, which is Cgang09. A coefficient in the 
Increased category is considered significant because the p-value is .028. This means that 
if law enforcement agencies reported a 1 unit increase in “cartel affiliated” gang activity 
then the odds of them increasing interventions strategies is -3.517. According to 
structural contingency theory, police agencies will change their organizations to reflect 
changes in their environment. These findings seem contrary to that. If they see increases 
in gang activity, then the odds they will respond by increasing their intervention 
strategies are negative. 
Table 6.15 Changed and Cgang09 Multinomial Regression 
  Coefficient SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
Cgang09 -1.020 1.474835     -0.69 0.489 -3.910     1.871 
Constant 1.763   1.432176      1.23 0.218 -1.044     4.570 
1 (base outcome) 
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Table 6.15 Changed and Cgang09 Multinomial Regression, Continued 
  Coefficient SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
2 
Cgang09 
-3.517**     1.596    -2.20 0.028 -6.645   
-
0.389 
Constant 
3.741    1.407      2.66 0.008 0.983    
-
6.500 
N = 35, Pseudo R2 = 0.1247, LR Chi2(2) = 8.62, Prob> Chi2 = 0.0135 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
 
 Table 6.16 shows the margins for the multinomial regression model in table 6.15. 
If a law enforcement agency reports no “cartel affiliated” gang activity for the 10 gangs 
in the group, when Cgang09 equals zero, then there is a 12 percent chance that the law 
enforcement agency will decrease their intervention strategies, 2 percent chance of no 
change in intervention strategies, and 86 percent chance that they will increase the 
number of gang intervention strategies. On the other hand, if law enforcement agencies 
report a relatively high level of “cartel affiliated” gang activity, when Cgang09 equals 
one, then they are more likely to decrease the number of gang intervention strategies (48 
percent) and less likely to increase (29 percent). These findings are similar in nature to 
the previous margins model.  
Table 6.16 Changed and Cgang09 Margins 
Outcome Values Margin SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
0 0.119    0.089      1.34 0.179 -0.055 0.293 
.5 0.298***    0.091      3.27 0.001 0.119 0.476 
1 0.483****    0.116      4.17 0.000 0.256 0.710 
1.5 0.510**    0.231      2.20 0.028 0.056 0.963 
1 
0 0.020   0.028      0.74 0.460 -0.034     0.075 
.5 0.085    0.059      1.47 0.142 -0.028     0.198 
1 0.230**    0.094      2.44 0.015 0.045 0.414 
1.5 0.403*    0.242      1.67 0.095 -0.070 0.877 
2 
0 0.861****    0.097      8.86 0.000 0.670 1.051 
.5 0.617****    0.098      6.32 0.000 0.426     0.809 
1 0.287**    0.112      2.56 0.011 0.067     0.507 
1.5 0.087     0.082      1.06 0.290 -0.074     0.248 
N=35 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
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 Table 6.17 shows odds of law enforcement agencies being responsive, Changed, 
to the non-cartel affiliated gang activity in 2009, which is Ngang09. A coefficient in the 
Increased category is considered significant because the p-value is .099. This means that 
if law enforcement agencies reported a 1 unit increase in non-cartel affiliated gang 
activity then the odds of them increasing interventions strategies is -2.169. This is 
consistent with the other models. If law enforcement agencies see increases in gang 
activity, then the odds they will respond by increasing their intervention strategies are 
negative. This shows, to some extent, that law enforcement agencies are not more 
responsive to increased gang activity, let alone “cartel affiliated” gang activity.  
Table 6.17 Changed and Ngang09 Multinomial Regression 
  Coefficient SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
Ngang09 -1.788     1.359     -1.32 0.188 -4.452     0.876 
Constant 1.823   1.014      1.80 0.072 -0.165     3.811 
1 (base outcome) 
2 
Ngang09 -2.169*    1.316     -1.65 0.099 -4.749     0.411 
Constant 2.415    0.979      2.47 0.014 0.497     4.333 
N = 33, Pseudo R2 = 0.0455, LR Chi2(2) = 2.98, Prob> Chi2 = 0.2252 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
 
 Table 6.18 shows the margins for the multinomial regression model in table 6.17. 
If a law enforcement agency reports no non-cartel affiliated gang activity for the 10 gangs 
in the group, when Ngang09 equals zero, then there is a 34 percent chance that the law 
enforcement agency will decrease their intervention strategies, 5 percent chance of no 
change in intervention strategies, and 13 percent chance that they will increase the 
number of gang intervention strategies. On the other hand, if law enforcement agencies 
report a relatively high level of non-cartel affiliated gang activity, when Ngang09 equals 
one, then they are less likely to decrease the number of gang intervention strategies (31% 
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percent) and more likely to increase (39 percent). These finding are not like the two 
previous models. Law enforcement agencies, at least when responding non-cartel gang 
activity, act in an expected way. They are more likely to decrease intervention strategies 
when they experience no gang activity and they increase their intervention strategies 
when they experience relatively high numbers of gang activity. 
Table 6.18 Changed and Ngang09 Margins 
Outcome Values Margin SE z P>|z| 95% C.I. 
0 
0 0.337***    0.130      2.59 0.009      0.082 0.591 
.5 0.346****    0.086 4.01 0.000 0.177     0.515 
1 0.312**     0.142     2.20 0.028 0.034 0.591 
1.5 0.228 0.205      1.11 0.265 -0.173 0.630 
1 
0 0.054  0.049      1.11 0.265 -0.041 0.150 
.5 0.137**    0.064 2.12 0.034 0.010 0.263 
1 0.302**    0.140      2.16 0.031 0.028    0.576 
1.5 0.539*    0.287      1.88 0.060 -0.023 1.101 
2 
0 0.609****    0.134      4.55 0.000 0.347     0.871 
.5 0.517****    0.091 5.66 0.000 0.338 0.696 
1 0.386**    0.151      2.56 0.010 0.090  0.681 
1.5 0.233 0.200      1.17 0.244 -0.159     0.625 
N=33 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.000 
 
 Other analyses were attempted, but were abandoned when no effects could be 
seen. Instead of combining all the gangs into Ogang, Cgang, and Ngang, the author 
originally tried to split the gangs based on central identifying factors as well as “cartel 
affiliated” and non-cartel affiliated groups. For example, there are predominantly black 
gangs (e.g., Bloods and Crips), predominantly Hispanic gangs (e.g., MS-13 and the 
Mexican Mafia), and there are organized motorcycle gangs (e.g., Hells Angels and the 
Pagans). Putting gangs in these types of groups and regressing the intervention strategies 
would potentially show if intervention strategies were less effective against different 
gang groups. These groupings failed to produce significant results because the effects 
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were spread thinly due to the low observation numbers. Before creating the Increased, 
Decreased, and the No Change variables, the author attempted to regress all the 
intervention strategies separately to determine if certain intervention strategies had more 
of an effect on gang activity, but the effects were not significant so combining the 
intervention strategies and using two years worth of data was necessary. More nuanced 
questions could not be answered with the current data.  
Reliability and Validity 
 Reliability. 
 The reliability of the data is improved by having two years of survey data 
available. If there were spikes in the data where some districts reported no gang activity 
in one year and then reported very high levels of gang activity the next year then it could 
pose a potential problem for reliability. Through initial screening of the data, there have 
been gradual increases and decreases in scores.  
 Internal Validity. 
 The models above are not being presented as unbiased or causal, but more 
exploratory and descriptive. The violations of assumptions are not going to undermine 
the goals of the study. The sampling issues could be discussed without running 
specification and heteroskedasticity tests. The declining survey response rate has 
decreased the amount of usable data because the departments that responded in 2009 had 
to respond in 2010 to be included in the study. The lack of observations in the models 
above is a major cause for concern because without a sufficient amount of observations 
the models are not significant. Any coefficients that were found to be significant have to 
be interpreted with caution because the overall models were not significant. Future 
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research might want to look at improving response rates for the surveys so more 
observations could be included in the models. Although there are multiple sets of data 
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2012), aggregating these data sets will provide more insignificant 
results because there is a wide range of participation amongst the survey takers. It would 
be highly unlikely for even more than 20 agencies to respond to the survey all four years.  
 The data source is another cause for concern. The dark figure of crime also 
applies to identifying gang members. No matter the amount of high-tech identification 
software, or however big the gang unit is, there are few departments that would claim that 
they have identified every gang member in their jurisdiction (Maxson, 1995). It is 
inevitable for gang members to fall through the cracks and escape detection. The level of 
gang activity reported cannot be taken with perfect confidence, but should be considered 
as a rough estimate. For instance, a car is stolen and is later recovered, but there are no 
suspects. Is this gang-related or are some high school youths looking for a joy ride? The 
department cannot definitively label this incident as gang-related. Despite this, law 
enforcement reports still represent the best estimation of gang activity. That being said, 
the level of gang activity might be under-represented or over-represented in certain 
jurisdictions because designation procedures are not perfect.  
 The list provided by the FBI of gangs that are “affiliated” with cartels is also a 
cause for validity concerns. The Crips in Arizona are not necessarily the same as the 
Crips in Texas. Perhaps it is appropriate to label that there is an “affiliation” between the 
Texas chapter of the Crips, but it is inappropriate to say that the Crips in Arizona are 
associated with cartels in the same way. Since this study is more exploratory in nature 
and not claiming unbiased results, this concern is not a damning one. If a study were 
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trying to present definitive results then the researcher would have to go through a more 
rigorous process of evaluating the “affiliations”. 
 External Validity. 
 The use of control groups lessens external validity problems. With the control 
group, Ogang, the author is able to compare the effects of intervention strategies on both 
types of gang groups. The quality of the control group is not perfect because as 
mentioned before the level of gang activity reported is only a rough estimate. If the 
sample size were large enough to yield statistically precise findings then perhaps the 
findings could be generalizable to the state of Arizona and to other southern states with 
“cartel affiliated” gangs.  
            If further research were to be conducted using this data then the declining 
response rates over the years would be a concern for external validity. This study used the 
2009 data that had a 71.68% response rate, which is a high response rate, but if some sort 
of longitudinal study were to be done then the researchers must address the dismal 
response rates in 2010 and 2012. Lower response rates are an issue because identification 
of the gang issue becomes less accurate because fewer law enforcement agencies are 
returning their surveys. The Arizona Gang Threat Assessment has difficulty generalizing 
the gang threat in Arizona without a response from every law enforcement agency 
coupled with an already tricky population to identify. Possible fixes are discussed below. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Limitations 
 Apart from the reliability and validity of this study, there are several limitations. 
First, the level of these gang intervention strategies and how they are enforced is not level 
across every agency. This could be problematic when one agency holds high standards 
and have benchmarks for what they consider a certain intervention strategy and then 
another agency that claims to practice particular intervention strategies, but have low 
standards for said strategies. This type of response can skew the effectiveness of certain 
intervention strategies. The GTA could list standards of criteria that an agency must 
check-off before stating that the agency practices a certain enforcement strategy. 
Although helpful, this could lengthen the time it takes to fill out the survey and thus hurt 
an already declining survey response rate.  
 Second, through this survey it is difficult, if not impossible, to view the resources 
or the capability of each agency to enact enforcement strategies. One could only assume 
that bigger counties can have bigger budgets so they can practice more intervention 
strategies while smaller counties have fewer resources. This poses a similar problem as 
mentioned above. This is not a big concern because the smaller counties are typically the 
ones that have lower levels of gang activity, which justifies the fewer resources. But of 
course, some could argue that these agencies from smaller counties do not have the 
resources or the capability to identify gang activity if they wanted to. This concern could 
be fixed by taking the average of agency budgets and number of officers.  
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 A third limitation is the declining response rates. In 2008, the AZCJC enjoyed a 
very high response rate of 87.68%, but it has declined over the years to an 
underwhelming 57.66% in 2010 and 58.72% in 2012. There is no penalty for not filling 
out the survey. The agencies that do fill out the survey view the results as helpful or view 
their participation in the survey as helping their cause for grant funding or funding to help 
aid their gang problem. This harms the generalizability of the survey findings and studies 
that choose to use the data. To fix this issue, the state could mandate that law 
enforcement agencies fill out this survey, but for the state to see any reason to, the state 
must see the potential of this survey and data. The state must see an influx of researchers 
using this survey data in important studies to justify a mandate.  
 Fourth, there could have been potential error while answering the survey. The 
survey could be pushed down to a lower-level employee because it is not deemed 
important. The staff that the chief puts in charge of filling out the survey could have very 
little knowledge about the gang activity in the district. This lowered perception of 
importance can be illustrated by the declining response rates over the years. This issue 
should be downplayed because if the agencies did not view it as important then they 
would not waste time to return the filled out survey at all. To fix this concern, the AZCJC 
could send out two surveys to be filled out by two different people in the agency to test 
inter-rater reliability. The average of these surveys would suffice if they reached a certain 
threshold of agreement. Again, this prolongs the filling out process that could hurt the 
response rates.  
 Fifth, the responses for the level of gang activity for each gang are not measured 
in numbers, but on basic estimates, albeit informed by intelligence gathered through 
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intervention strategies. Nonetheless, one agency’s “High” might be another agency’s 
“Moderate”. This subjective measure could pose a problem because some areas might be 
exaggerating gang problems while some areas might be underplaying gang problems 
(Zatz, 1987). This issue could potentially be fixed by offering ranges such as 0-25 or 
100+ to indicate a better estimate of the amount of gang members in each individual 
gang. These values would be partnered with the Likert responses so ease of interpretation 
is present.   
 Sixth, this limitation raises a red flag with ethical implications. Some agencies 
could be claiming that there is more gang activity than is actually present in order to 
obtain more funding. Exaggerated levels of gang activity can be a concern for 
interpreting results, but it is tamed by the notion that law enforcement chiefs do not want 
to be the ones in charge of areas of “High” gang activity because that could harm their 
authority and the public’s perception of the chief. This concern could be fixed by adding 
a second measurement of gang activity by another entity if a certain agency were in 
consideration for increased funding. This would make sure that agencies are truthful in 
their initial filling out of the survey.  
 Seventh, and most likely the biggest weakness of this study, is the assumption that 
each “cartel affiliated” gang has the same amount of affiliation with the cartels as any 
other “affiliated” gang. What needs to be clearer are the quality of these relationships 
between gangs and the cartels. It is one thing to say that a drug slinger in Yuma is selling 
drugs once belonging to the cartels. The relationship is entirely different if that Yuma 
slinger is on the payroll of the Sinaloa cartel. This is where connections need to be better 
investigated and researched. Possible solutions will be discussed below. Without 
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identifying the true quality of these partnerships, it is entirely possible that the cartel issue 
could be overblown and in turn unnecessarily incite fear in the citizens of America. Apart 
from the various limitations of the data, it still represents the best source at hand to 
answer the questions of this study. 
Discussion 
 This study attempted to answer three questions. First, do law enforcement 
intervention strategies differently affect the activity of “cartel affiliated” gangs as 
opposed to those that are not affiliated with cartel? Second, are changes in the level of 
intervention strategies related to the changes in gang activity? Third, are law enforcement 
agencies more responsive towards cartel “affiliated” gangs? To answer these questions, 
the author attempted three sets of analyses: dummy variable regression, change score 
analysis, and multinomial logistic regression.  
 The dummy variable regression was to help answer the first question and find 
support for the first two hypotheses. For the dummy variable regression, the author 
created three groups: Ogang, Cgang, Ngang for 2009 and 2010. Ogang was created to 
see the weighted average effects of intervention strategies on all the gangs in the study. 
The groups of interest were Cgang and Ngang. Cgang had drug “cartel affiliated” gangs 
while Ngang had non-cartel affiliated gangs and acted as a control group for comparison. 
A dummy variable regression was used to see if increasing or decreasing levels of 
intervention strategies had an affect on the level of activity of the gangs analyzed.   
 Deterrence theory suggests that intervention strategies would impede gang 
activity because the cost of committing the crime would outweigh the benefits of 
committing the crime (Gibbs, 1975; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973). Increasing intervention 
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strategies should have a negative impact on gang activity, but the Ogang and Cgang 
models were able to reveal that decreasing intervention strategies had a negative impact 
on Ogang and Cgang gang activity at the .10 alpha level. This finding is contrary to the 
first and second hypotheses. Given the low number of observations, this finding is not 
generalizable. It is possible that with more years of data and with a higher response rate 
could show support for the hypotheses at lower alpha levels. This question was important 
to ask because the public has concern that cartels are invading or that gangs will be more 
cartel-like (Grillo, 2011). This finding shows, at least with this data, that “cartel affiliated” 
gangs are not becoming more brazen and they are not impervious to intervention 
strategies.  
 The change score analysis was to help answer the second question and find 
support for the third hypothesis. For the change score analysis, the author created change 
scores for the gang groups. Ogang09 was subtracted from Ogang10 to create 
ChangeOgang. This same process was also done to create ChangeCgang and 
ChangeNgang. This analysis would determine if the changes in the amount of 
intervention strategies were related to changes in gang activity. Unfortunately, with the 
small amount of observations in these models, it was difficult to get anything significant. 
Findings from this analysis would definitely be useful for law enforcement agencies. 
When it comes to the budget, law enforcement could count the cost of cutting potential 
intervention strategies to save money if it shown that reducing intervention strategies do 
not have a huge impact on the changes of gang activity.  
 The multinomial logistic regression was to help answer the third question and find 
support for the fourth hypothesis. For the multinomial logistic regression, the author 
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created the categorical variable, Changed. This simply combined the three dummy 
variables created for the dummy variable regression. This analysis would determine the 
responsiveness that law enforcement agencies show towards these groups. There were 
some significant coefficients in these models, but they were contrary to the hypothesis.  
In the margin models, law enforcement agencies reporting non-cartel gang activity 
behaved in a way that was expected, they were more likely to decrease intervention 
strategies if they reported no gang activity while they were more likely to increase 
intervention strategies if they reported relatively high levels of gang activity. This goes in 
tune with structural contingency theory, but the agencies that were reporting “cartel 
affiliated” gang activity behaved in an unexpected way. If a law enforcement agency 
reports no “cartel affiliated” gang activity then there is a 12 percent chance that the law 
enforcement agency will decrease their intervention strategies and 86 percent chance that 
they will increase the number of gang intervention strategies. On the other hand, if law 
enforcement agencies report a relatively high level of “cartel affiliated” gang activity, 
then they are more likely to decrease the number of gang intervention strategies and less 
likely to increase. According to structural contingency theory, organizations will change 
to respond to their environments to be more efficient (Donaldson, 1996). Law 
enforcement agencies could have perceived that they could be more effective by cutting 
some intervention strategies and focusing on a few strategies such as gang units and 
intelligence gathering. Or it is possible that some of these departments faced budgetary 
constraints and were not able to expand in intervention strategies.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 The four sets of hypotheses cannot be proven true given the lack of significant 
findings. These questions have to be set-aside for a different time for when the data is 
better. This section will explore a two-part process in which to improve the data. The first 
step is to have a standardized instrument to record responses. As great as the Arizona 
Gang Threat Assessment is, it does not offer direct insight about potential cartel and gang 
partnerships. Researchers and analysts that have been following the Mexican drug war 
would develop a new instrument. This survey instrument would ideally record which 
cartels are active in which areas of the United States and which gangs they are affiliated 
with. Saying that the Bloods are “affiliated” with the cartels is not sufficient. A specific 
instrument that records that the Sinaloa Cartel is working the Bloods in Arizona, but not 
the Bloods in Florida is useful and can be used by researchers and law enforcement 
agencies. It would useful to have data regarding “cartel affiliated” gangs from other 
states. States without any noticeable cartel related activity would be able to serve as 
control groups because the intervention strategies they use will be against regular gangs. 
The data would ideally stretch back to before the Mexican drug war began so that the 
years prior could be used as a reference point as well, but seeing that the past cannot be 
changed, it will be important to keep track for future years to build up enough data to see 
possible trends.  
 As mentioned earlier, local law enforcement has a difficult time identifying gang 
activity, making observations they report about gang activity not entirely reliable, but 
since they do offer the best estimate of gang activity they remain vital in collecting gang 
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activity data. Many of these agencies with gang units lacked what typical programs or 
units in standard organizations would have such as mission statements, policies, 
procedures, and rules which reveals an unprecedented need for these units to be 
overhauled for restructuring because they are not equipped to deal with gang problem 
(Katz & Webb, 2006). This is where strong partnership between federal law enforcement 
and local law enforcement will be useful. Federal and local agencies would both fill out 
the survey in an attempt to improve inter-rater reliability. If the Department of Homeland 
Security, the federal department that deals mostly with border issues, and local law 
enforcement agencies work in close relation in regard to the cartel issue then identifying 
cartel activity and gang relations could potentially improve. For example, the Department 
of Homeland Security’s Phoenix field office would collaborate with municipal law 
enforcement agencies in Arizona and it would be a symbiotic relationship where 
information is shared to help inform strategies and potential gang busts. This partnership 
would be incredibly useful for smaller agencies that might have a limited amount of 
resources.  
 Now that ways of reporting gang and cartel activity has improved, the next part is 
to improving the resources that agencies have to identify activity. The quality of these 
potential relationships between Mexican drug cartels and U.S. gangs need to be 
researched more because of the ongoing issues with the Mexican drug war and the drug 
trade in the United States. Better resources are needed to capture the nuances in these 
relationships, but how is this possible? Consider changing the label Mexican drug cartels 
have of “traditional organized crime groups” to insurgent or terrorists groups. Mexico 
recently changed their designation of these groups because traditional law enforcement 
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tactics were not effective against cartel activity in Mexico (Longmire, 2011). By 
changing the label, funding would come from different avenues to better strategize 
against these new insurgent groups.  
 The next question is how to change the label. The Department of Homeland 
Security would hold multiple discussions with leading researchers and analysts who have 
kept up with the drug war and discuss what it means to change the label (Longmire, 
2011). Through this process, new strategies could then be developed on both sides of the 
border to combat cartels as an insurgency and a traditional organized crime group. This 
could help shed light on the drug distribution network and even help identify these 
mysterious middlemen. These new strategies would, hypothetically, make it safer for 
researchers on the front lines to gather data. The cartel literature would benefit by 
increasing the amount of official quantitative data. Future research might also want to add 
a qualitative component to illustrate the nature of these “partnerships”. It could be 
definitively stated whether or not these partnerships are blown out of proportion through 
this process. Researchers could talk to members of these gangs and ask about their 
experiences when dealing with the cartels and how they view the police. They could see 
if they felt more machismo being backed by the cartels. Of course, this is a dangerous 
approach and it could implicate them in multiple crimes, so it might be more feasible to 
talk convicted gang members who are prison. 
 Urgency in this area is mostly increased by media portrayals of possible cartel-
linked deaths of U.S. citizens while on U.S. soil. Once that story fades, the urgency 
wanes. A lack of urgency is warranted because overall crime in Arizona dropped 35 
percent between 2004 and 2009, which lands in the same time frame as when the 
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Mexican Drug War began to ramp up (Grillo, 2011). The number of murders in Phoenix 
decreased from 167 in 2008 to 122 in 2009 (Grillo, 2011). The violence as a result of the 
war is not having the same effect in the United States as it is in Mexico. It could be 
possible that drug cartels are learning to better hide their operations in the United States 
or it could be the case that they are slowly moving to different areas to operate. No matter 
the level of their operations, cartels still pose a threat to public safety. Whether these 
concerns are warranted are still yet to be seen, but it is in the public’s best interest to look 
into these groups more.  
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